Protection of Trade Secrets in South Carolina by Day, Richard E.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 42 Issue 3 Article 5 
Spring 1991 
Protection of Trade Secrets in South Carolina 
Richard E. Day 
University of South Carolina 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard E. Day, Protection of Trade Secrets in South Carolina, 42 S. C. L. Rev. 689 (1991). 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS IN
SOUTH CAROLINA
RICHARD E. DAY*
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................... 689
II. DEFINITION OF TRADE SECRET ......................... 694
A. The "Use" Requirement ......................... 694
B. Relative versus Absolute Secrecy ................. 696
C. Maintenance of Secrecy ......................... 698
III. THEORIES OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION ............... 700
A. Property Theory ................................ 700
B. Breach of Confidence ............................ 700
C. Improper M eans ................................ 701
D. M isappropriation ............................... 703
IV. REMED SS ........................................... 706
A. In General ..................................... 706
B. Injunctive Relief ................................ 708
C. Good Faith Defense ............................. 710
D. Statute of Limitations ........................... 713
E. Effect of UTSA on Other Law ................... 713
V. CONCLUSION ......................................... 714
I. INTRODUCTION
Competition in this age of accelerating technological advancement,
coupled with the ever-increasing costs of research and development
needed to keep pace, has led to increased resort to industrial espio-
nage, not only by smaller companies lacking in resources for research
and development, but also by major corporations.' In addition to such
outright espionage, a major concern continues to be the unauthorized
disclosure or use of confidential information by present or former em-
ployees or agents, often induced by competitors. As a consequence of
limitations in federal patent and copyright law protection, trade secret
law has become increasingly important to protect against such
* John William Thurmond Chair Professor of Law, University of South Carolina
School of Law. B.S. 1951, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1957, University of Michigan.
1. See Hofer, Business Warfare Over Trade Secrets, LITIGATION, Summer 1983, at
8.
1
Day: Protection of Trade Secrets in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
activities.
The Federal Copyright Act 2 (Act) does not protect ideas as such,
but only protects against the copying of the particular form of their
expression.3 For example, copyright may protect against the copying of
a computer software program and its accompanying manuals, but not
the idea embodied in the program. Furthermore, when the idea and its
expression are inseparable, copyright will not even protect the form of
expression of the idea, because to do so would be to extend protection
to the idea itself.' Because of these shortcomings, many companies
choose trade secret protection even when copyright is an available
alternative. 5
The 1976 revision of the Act did not expressly preempt state
rights or remedies for activities that are "not equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by
[the Act]."e While the form of the expression of a trade secret may be
covered by the Act, trade secret protection extends to misappropria-
tion of the idea itself. Therefore, the Copyright Act does not preempt
trade secret protection, because it goes beyond, and is not equivalent
to, the rights within the scope of the Act.7
2. 17 U.S.C. § 101-914 (1988).
3. This dichotomy of idea and expression was established in Baker v. Selden, 101
U.S. 99, 101-02, 107 (1879), and is codified in § 102(b) of the Copyright Act: "In no case
does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, proce-
dure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of
the form in which it is described, explained illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17
U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
4. This would not be permitted under copyright law because it "would confer a
monopoly of the 'idea' upon the copyright owner . .." Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry
Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971).
5. See, e.g., Chapman, California Uniform Trade Secrets Act: A Comparative
Analysis of the Act and the Common Law, 2 COMPUTER & HIGH-TECH. L. J. 389, 389-90
(1986).
6. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3) (1988).
7. See, e.g., Warrington Assocs. v. Real-Time Eng'g Sys., 522 F. Supp. 367 (N.D.
111 1981).
The practical distinction between the two interests is manifest. While disclo-
sure of the expression does not vitiate rights secured by copyright law, that
same disclosure may well strip the underlying idea of its confidentiality, and
thus its status as a trade secret. To a certain degree the two respective rights in
intellectual property interact. To the extent a work has been copyrighted and
published, the chances of unprivileged disclosure may increase. But the mere
fact that an expression is copyrighted does not, in and of itself, disclose the
trade secret or eliminate its mantle of confidentiality.
Id. at 368.
Under the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, secrecy may be maintained by registering
a copyright without depositing a copy. Section 408(c)(1) of the Act states:
The Register of Copyrights is authorized to specify by regulation the ad-
[Vol. 42
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Federal patent law is intended to encourage new inventions and
processes8 that are useful and "nonobvious"9 by granting a legal mo-
nopoly to make, use, or sell them for seventeen years in exchange for
their public disclosure. Many ideas, for example most computer
software programs, fail to meet the strict patent standards of newness,
usefulness, and nonobviousness. Some inventions that facially meet the
general description for patentable subject matter have been excluded
from protection. 10 Finally, the risk always exists that a court will de-
cide that the Patent Office improperly issued a patent and, thus, the
inventor will have disclosed the invention to competitors with no corre-
sponding patent protection. Consequently, in view of the difficulty in
qualifying for a patent, of the substantial number of patents that the
courts have invalidated, and the limited coverage and duration of pat-
ents, there remains a need for the protection of commercially valuable
ideas and business information. 1 This gap is filled primarily by state
ministrative classes into which works are to be placed for purposes of deposit
and registration, and the nature of the copies or phonorecords to be deposited
in the various classes specified. The regulations may require or permit, for par-
ticular classes, the deposit of identifying material instead of copies or pho-
norecords ....
Copyright Revision Act, 17 U.S.C. § 408(c)(1) (emphasis added). See Nat'l Conference of
Bar Examiners v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. II1. 1980) (con-
firming validity of procedures under § 408(c)(1)), aff'd, 692 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983).
8. Patentable subject matter includes "any new and useful process, machine, man-
ufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof ..
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
9. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1988). To be patentable, an invention must be "nonobvi-
ous" to a person of ordinary skill in the art to which the invention pertains. Id. § 103;
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10-17 (1966).
10. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588-89 (1978) and Gottschalk v. Ben-
son, 409 U.S. 63, 67-72 (1972) (mathematical formulas and algorithms); Funk Bros. Seed
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.)
62, 112-21 (1853) (laws of nature and basic scientific principles); Loew's Drive-In Thea-
tres v. Park-In Theatres, 174 F.2d 547, 551-52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 822
(1949) and Guthrie v. Curlett, 10 F.2d 725, 726 (2d Cir. 1926) (business ideas).
11. Trademark law likewise offers little protection for business ideas. Trademark
law arose out of common-law proscriptions of unfair competition and "passing-off," and
the Federal Trademark Act is designed to prevent unfair competition and consumer de-
ception by the use of a trademark that is confusingly similar to one previously adopted
and in use by another. However, unpatentable product configurations and "trade dress"
may be protected from subsequent confusing usage when they perform the trademark
function by serving to identify the source of the product or service. See, e.g., Fuddruck-
ers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 1987); Brunswick Corp. v.
Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 517 (10th Cir. 1987); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart, 754 F.2d
71, 75-77, 79 (2d Cir. 1985); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210,
1217-23 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976). Prior to the Trademark Revision
Act of 1976, protection was acquired by adoption and use. Although the Act now permits
1991]
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common law or statutes that allow for the protection of trade secrets,
whether patentable or not.
12
In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.13 the Supreme Court deter-
mined that the federal patent law did not preempt state trade secret
protection. The Court noted that trade secret and patent law had coex-
isted for more than one hundred years, that both encourage invention,
and that trade secret protection does not remove any matter from pub-
lic domain because "[b]y definition a trade secret has not been placed
in the public domain.
''14
State courts created and developed the law that protects trade
secrets as a branch of tort law. Notwithstanding its obvious importance
to interstate business, the law has not developed evenly. What uni-
formity exists in the common-law evolution is attributable primarily to
the 1939 Restatement of Torts (Restatement).15 Although the more
populous commercial states have reported a substantial number of
trade secret decisions since 1939, this has not been the case in other
states, including South Carolina. Even in those states that have had
significant trade secret litigation, conflict and uncertainty about the
scope of trade secret protection and remedies remain.
In spite of the growing need for uniform trade secret protection,
federal registration of a mark prior to use, statutory remedies still require actual use.
12. The Restatement of Torts distinguishes trade secrets from patent protection,
noting:
A trade secret may be a device or process which is patentable; but it need not
be that. It may be a device or process which is clearly anticipated in the prior
art or one which is merely a mechanical improvement that a good mechanic
can make. Novelty and invention are not requisite for a trade secret as they are
for patentability. These requirements are essential to patentability because a
patent protects against unlicensed use of the patented device or process even
by one who discovers it properly through independent research. The patent
monopoly is a reward to the inventor. But such is not the case with a trade
secret. Its protection is not based on a policy of rewarding or otherwise encour-
aging the development of secret processes or devices. The protection is merely
against breach of faith and reprehensible means of learning another's secret.
For this limited protection it is not appropriate to require also the kind of
novelty and invention which is a requisite of patentability.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939); see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974). The court in Kewanee provides:
Novelty, in the patent law sense, is not required for a trade secret. "Quite
clearly discovery is something less than invention." However, some novelty will
be required if merely because that which does not possess novelty is usually
known; secrecy, in the context of trade secrets, thus implies at least minimal
novelty.
Id. (citation omitted). See generally Chapman, supra note 5.
13. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
14. Id. at 484.
15. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757-759 (1939).
[Vol. 42
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the American Law Institute (ALI) omitted unfair competition, includ-
ing trade secret protection, from its 1978 Restatement (Second) of
Torts. The ALI believed that this area of the law had developed to the
point that it required separate treatment."6 Recognizing the need for
modernization and uniformity, states increasingly have turned to codi-
fication of the law of trade secret protection. This movement is primar-
ily a consequence of the proposed Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA)
that the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws adopted and promulgated. 17 At this writing, thirty-eight states
have enacted the UTSA.
The South Carolina Bar's Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law
Committee has recommended passage of the UTSA;' 8 the South Caro-
lina Bar has endorsed its enactment. The time has come for South Car-
olina to join the growing list of states that have already adopted, or are
in the process of adopting, the UTSA. In addition to the desirable re-
sults of clarification, modernization, and uniformity, adoption will in-
crease the state's rate of commercial expansion.
Determining whether something is a trade secret, determining the
basis of trade secret protection, and determining the protection a trade
secret should receive are interdependent issues, and each is comple-
mentary to the others. This review begins with the definition of a trade
secret, then discusses the theories, or bases, for trade secret protection,
and concludes with the remedies for trade secret "misappropriation."
It includes an explanation of the key provisions in the UTSA: the defi-
nitions of "trade secret,"' 9  "misappropriation,"' 0  and "improper
means,"21 and the remedial provisions for injunctive relief,
22 damages,23
and attorney's fees.
24
16. An ALI committee is currently working on a draft of the Restatement (Third)
of Unfair Competition, which includes trade secret law. The draft is not expected to be
completed before 1993. The author of this Article is a member of the Consultive Group
for this draft.
17. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT, 14 U.L.A. 437-67 (1990). The author of this Article
was a Commissioner and member of the'Uniform Act's drafting committee.
18. This committee has since been redesignated the Committee on Intellectual
Property Law. The author of this Article was chairman of this committee when it consid-
ered and endorsed passage of the UTSA.
19. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 437-38 (1990).
20. Id. § 1(2).
21. Id. § 1(1), 14 U.L.A. 437.
22. Id. § 2(a), 14 U.L.A. 449.
23. Id. § 3, 14 U.L.A. 455-56.
24. Id. § 4, 14 U.L.A. 459.
1991]
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II. DEFINITION OF TRADE SECRET
The first issue in any trade secret case "is not whether there was a
confidential relationship or a breach of contract or some other kind of
misappropriation, but whether, in fact, there was a trade secret to be
misappropriated. '25 Defining a trade secret has proven to be a difficult
task. Indeed, the Restatement of Torts concluded that "[a]n exact def-
inition of a trade secret is not possible. '2 Despite this observation, the
Restatement provides the most generally accepted basis for a workable
trade secret definition. It states that a trade secret "may consist of any
formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in
one's business, and which gives [one] an opportunity to obtain an ad-
vantage over competitors who do not know or use it."2 7 Although the
category of "information" in the Restatement definition appears to be
comprehensive, it is limited because: (1) coverage is limited to "a pro-
cess or device for continuous use" in the business, (2) the information
must not be known generally in the trade or business, and (3) the
owner must exercise reasonable diligence to preserve its secrecy. 28
While the UTSA's trade secret definition borrows heavily from the
Restatement, it differs in some important particulars. The UTSA de-
fines a trade secret as:
Information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, de-
vice, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent eco-
nomic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to,
and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is
the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
29
A. The "Use" Requirement
One significant departure in the UTSA definition is the deletion of
the Restatement's requirement that a trade secret be continuously
25. Lowndes Prods. v. Brower, 259 S.C. 322, 327, 191 S.E.2d 761, 764 (1972).
26. RESTATEMENT oF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939); see also Future Plastics v.
Ware Shoals Plastics, 340 F. Supp. 1376, 1383 (D.S.C. 1972) ("Legal decisions and text
books indicate that a trade secret is very hard to define.").
27. RESTATEMENT oF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939), quoted with approval in
Lowndes Prods., 259 S.C. at 327, 191 S.E.2d at 764. See also Greenberg v. Croydon Plas-
tics, 378 F. Supp. 806, 812 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ("Comment b to section 757 of the Restate-
ment of Torts is the most lucid attempt to date to define the elusive beast.").
28. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
29. UNw. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 437-38 (1990).
[Vol. 42
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used in one's business. 30 According to the Restatement, a trade secret
"differs from other secret information in a business . . . in that it is
not simply information as to single or ephemeral events in the conduct
of the business ... ."31 Consequently, many areas are excluded from
trade secret protection under the Restatement definition. These areas
include research and development, business ideas, certain technical
skills, and other types of confidential information that have not been
continuously used because of lack of opportunity or means, or for other
business reasons regarding proper timing.
32
By deleting the Restatement's requirement .of "continuous use in
the operation of the business,"33 and by expanding the trade secret
definition to include confidential information having "actual or poten-
tial" value, 34 the UTSA extends protection to information that other-
wise qualifies as a trade secret from its conception whether or not it is
ever used commercially. The UTSA recognizes that an idea may have
value in itself, without further use. It may provide an advantage over
those who have no knowledge of it, such as with negative research,
which proves, for example, "that a certain process will not work."'35 Se-
cret information may provide a competitive advantage for potentially
profitable commercial development, as in successful research and de-
velopment.36 The UTSA's broader definition also appears to provide
trade secret protection for new and unused ideas offered for license or
sale in confidence to another who profits from their use.
37
30. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
31. Id. (citation omitted).
32. See, e.g., Gabriel Co. v. Talley Indus., 137 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 630, 633 (D. Ariz.
1963) (generalized research had not resulted in the degree of knowledge required for
protection as a trade secret). Under the Restatement view, trade secret protection is not
available to protect against the misappropriation and use of a previously unused new
idea. Accord Moore v. Ford Motor Corp., 28 F.2d 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1928), aff'd, 43 F.2d 685
(2d Cir. 1930).
Common-law cases following such a restrictive view are based on several theories.
One theory is that an idea has value only by its productive utilization, and, therefore, is
not protectable without such use. Another theory is that until an idea is actually put to
use it is unknown whether it affords a competitive advantage. In addition, the protection
for pre-utilized ideas might confer a monopoly over research and development. See
Chapman, supra note 5, at 393.
33. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
34. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 437-38 (1990).
35. Id. § 1 comment, 14 U.L.A. 438-39.
36. See, e.g., Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.)
(per curiam) (liability imposed for developmental cost savings with respect to product
not marketed), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975), cited in UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §
1 comment, 14 U.L.A. 439 (1990).
37. See, e.g., R. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 8.03 (1989). Such protec-
tion has already developed under the common law. Id.
1991]
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The value of an unutilized idea may depend upon its commercial
feasibility and ultimate use, but that should not affect the question of
protection, any more than a patent's lack of commercial feasibility and
exploitation should affect its protection. Moreover, unlike patent pro-
tection, trade secret protection of an unutilized idea has no effect on
competition. A trade secret does not prevent another's use of an idea
that is obtained by proper means such as independent research and
development. The only prohibition under the UTSA is that a trade
secret may not be misappropriated by "improper means. ' '38
B. Relative versus Absolute Secrecy
While "[n]ovelty, in the patent law sense, is not required for a
trade secret. . . , some novelty will be required if merely because that
which does not possess novelty is usually known; secrecy, in the con-
text of trade secrets, thus implies at least minimal novelty." 39 Both the
Restatement and the UTSA would deny trade secret protection to in-
formation which is generally known in the trade or business, or is read-
ily ascertainable. 40 Absolute secrecy is not required to preserve a trade
38. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1(2), 14 U.L.A. 437-38 (1990).
39. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (citation omitted).
40. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939):
Secrecy. The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret. Matters of
public knowledge or of general knowledge in an industry cannot be appropri-
ated by one as his secret. Matters which are completely disclosed by the goods
which one markets cannot be his secret. Substantially, a trade secret is known
only in the particular business in which it is used. It is not requisite that only
the proprietor of the business know it. He may, without losing his protection,
communicate it to employees involved in its use. He may likewise communicate
it to others pledged to secrecy. Others may also know of it independently, as,
for example, when they have discovered the process or formula by independent
invention and are keeping it secret. Nevertheless, a substantial element of se-
crecy must exist, so that, except by the use of improper means, there would be
difficulty in acquiring the information. An exact definition of a trade secret is
not possible. Some factors to be considered in determining whether given in-
formation is one's trade secret are: (1) the extent to which the information is
known outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employ-
ees and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by
him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to
him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by
him in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the
information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.
Id.
UNiW. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1 comment, 14 U.L.A. 438-39 (1990):
Because a trade secret need not be exclusive to confer a competitive ad-
vantage, different independent developers can acquire rights in the same trade
secret. . ..
[Vol. 42
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secret, however, and both the Restatement and the UTSA recognize
that protection is not lost merely by disclosure in confidence to em-
ployees and others, including licensees. "1 So long as a trade secret re-
mains not generally known or is not readily ascertainable, protection is
not lost merely because more than one, among many competitors, .may
learn the secret by proper means, such as by independent research and
invention, or even reverse engineering.
42
The degree of secrecy required by the UTSA can be determined by
examining whether the trade secret's economic value is derived from
the inability of a competitor to ascertain it readily by proper means. So
long as a competitive advantage exists over a single actual or potential
competitor who does not possess the information, and cannot readily
ascertain it by proper means, the trade secret should be protected from
misappropriation by improper means.
43
The language 'not being generally known to and not being readily ascer-
tainable by proper means by other persons' does not require that information
be generally known to the public for trade secret rights to be lost. If the princi-
pal persons who can obtain economic benefit from information are aware of it,
there is no trade secret ....
Information is readily ascertainable if it is available in trade journals, ref-
erence books, or published materials. Often, the nature of a product lends itself
to being readily copied as soon as it is available on the market. On the other
hand, if reverse engineering is lengthy and expensive, a person who discovers
the trade secret through reverse engineering can have a trade secret in the
information obtained from reverse engineering.
Id.
41. UNIF. TRADE SECRETs AcT § 1 comment, 14 U.L.A. 438-39 (1990). The United
States Supreme Court held:
The subject of a trade secret must be secret, and must not be of public
knowledge or of a general knowledge in the trade or business. This necessary
element of secrecy is not lost, however, if the holder of the trade secret reveals
the trade secret to another "in confidence, and under an implied obligation not
to use or disclose it." These others may include those of the holder's "employ-
ees to whom it is necessary to confide it, in order to apply it to the uses for
which it is intended." Often the recipient of confidential knowledge of the sub-
ject of a trade secret is a licensee of its holder.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974) (citations omitted).
42. The UTSA states:
Often, the nature of a product lends itself to being readily copied as soon as it
is available on the market. On the other hand, if reverse engineering is lengthy
and expensive, a person who discovers the trade secret through reverse engi-
neering can have a trade secret in the information obtained from reverse
engineering.
UNiF. TRADE SEcRsS AcT § 1 comment, 14 U.L.A. 438-39 (1990).
43. The Ninth Circuit noted this interdependence between secrecy and misappro-
priation and referred to the Restatement in Clark v. Bunker:
"The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret. Matters of public
knowledge or of general knowledge in an industry cannot be appropriated by
1991]
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C. Maintenance of Secrecy
Closely related to the issues of ease of ascertainability and im-
proper'means is the requirement that a trade secret owner must take
reasonable steps "under the circumstances" to maintain secrecy." Lack
of reasonable care may indicate either that the owner intends to aban-
don the secret, or that discovery readily may be made without using
improper means.
The reasonable care standard requires a balancing of the trade se-
cret's value against the cost and difficulty of preventing its misappro-
priation. The latter varies with the circumstances under which the se-
cret was acquired, either (1) in confidence, or under a duty to maintain
its secrecy, such as an employee, agent, or subcontractor, (2) by some
improper means, (3) through someone who has acquired it by improper
means, or (4) by accident or mistake.
Basic precautions would include disclosure only on a need-to-know
basis. When such disclosures are required, to employees and licensees
for example, the confidential nature of the disclosure and use should
be made clear. Prudence suggests that a written agreement to respect
and preserve the secrecy is desirable whenever possible. 5 This would
one as his secret." However, the interest protected by this branch of the law is
not secrecy as such. "The protection is merely against breach of faith and rep-
rehensible means of learning another's secret." Accordingly, "a substantial ele-
ment of secrecy must exist, so that, except by the use of improper means, there
would be difficulty in acquiring the information."
453 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1972) (citations omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs
§ 757 comment b (1939)), quoted with approval in Wilkes v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 383 F.
Supp. 1135, 1141 (D.S.C. 1974).
44. UNIF. TRADE SEcRETs ACT § 1(4)(ii), 14 U.L.A. 437-38 (1990). The South Caro-
lina Supreme Court addressed this issue and stated:
[I]f the person entitled to a trade secret wishes to have its exclusive use in his
own business, he must not fail to take all proper and reasonable steps to keep
it secret. He cannot lie back and do nothing to preserve its essential secret
quality, particularly when the subject matter of the process becomes known to
a number of individuals involved in its use or is observed in the course of man-
ufacture within plain view of others. "[O]ne may not venture on liberties with
his own secret, may not lightly or voluntarily hazard its leakage or escape, and
at the same time hold others to be completely obligated to observe it."
Lowndes Prods. v. Brower, 259 S.C. 322, 331, 191 S.E.2d 761, 766 (1972) (citations omit-
ted) (quoting J.T. Healy & Son v. James A. Murphy & Son, 357 Mass. 728, 260 N.E.2d
723 (1970)); see also Future Plastics v. Ware Shoals Plastics, 340 F. Supp. 1376 (D.S.C.
1972) (corporation with trade secret did nothing to protect it).
45. In addressing this situation, one court stated:
[O]ne who claims that he has a trade secret must exercise eternal vigilance.
This calls for constant warnings to all persons to whom the trade secret has
become known and obtaining from each an agreement, preferably in writing,
acknowledging its secrecy and promising to respect it. To exclude the public
[Vol. 42
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have the additional advantage of providing a breach of contract action
in addition to, or instead of, a tort action for misappropriation. The
UTSA does not displace "contractual remedies, whether or not based
upon misappropriation of a trade secret."' 6
Additional considerations apply in the case of industrial espionage,
as opposed to voluntary disclosures. As noted by the Commissioners'
comment to the UTSA, "[t]he courts do not require that extreme and
unduly expensive procedures be taken to protect trade secrets against
flagrant industrial espionage.' 47 As demonstrated by E.L duPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Christopher,'48 industrial espionage need not consti-
tute illegal or otherwise tortious conduct to amount to misappropria-
tion of a trade secret. In Christopher the defendant made an otherwise
lawful overflight of plaintiff's plant, while the plant was under con-
struction and before the roof was in place to discover trade secrets dis-
closed by the plant layout. The court refused to require the extraordi-
nary precautions necessary to prevent such spying:
Our tolerance of the espionage game must cease when the protections
required to prevent another's spying cost so much that the spirit of
inventiveness is dampened. Commercial privacy must be protected
from espionage which could not have been reasonably anticipated or
prevented .... Perhaps ordinary fences and roofs must be built to
shut out incursive eyes, but we need not require the discoverer of a
trade secret to guard against the unanticipated, the undetectable, or
the unpreventable methods of espionage now available.2'
The Christopher opinion recognizes the difficulty, if not the im-
possibility, of preventing industrial espionage. It sets an appropriate
standard of diligence for the trade secret owner. The court stated:
The market place must not deviate far from our mores. We should not
require a person or corporation to take unreasonable precautions to
prevent another from doing that which he ought not do in the first
place. Reasonable precautions against predatory eyes we may require,
but an impenetrable fortress is an unreasonable requirement, and we
are not disposed to burden industrial inventors with such a duty in
order to protect the fruits of their efforts.' 0
from the manufacturing area is not enough.
J.T. Healy & Son v. James A. Murphy & Son, 357 Mass. at 738, 260 N.E.2d at 731,
quoted in Future Plastics v. Ware Shoals Plastics, 340 F. Supp. 1376, 1383 (D.S.C. 1972)
(except for last sentence).
46. UNIF. TRADE" SEcRETS AcT § 7, 14 U.L.A. 463 (1990).
47. Id. § 1 comment, 14 U.L.A. 438-39.
48. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971).
49. Id. at 1016.
50. Id. at 1017.
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III. THEORIES OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION
A. Property Theory
It often has been argued that the basis for protecting trade secrets
is that they are "property," or give rise to a "protectable property in-
terest." 51 This begs the question. What is a "protectable property in-
terest"? The answer is an interest which the courts believe should be
protected. In other words, trade secrets should be protected because
the courts believe they should be protected. The question remains,
why, and under what circumstances, should a court protect a trade se-
cret? 2 The answer to this question has hinged on how the trade secret
has been or may be acquired.
B. Breach of Confidence
One well-established basis for trade secret protection is the breach
of a confidential relationship. Justice Holmes analyzed this relation-
ship in E.L dupont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland:
53
The word property as applied to trade-marks and trade secrets is an
unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the pri-
mary fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good
faith. Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the de-
fendant knows the facts, whatever they are, through a special confi-
dence that he accepted. The property may be denied but the confi-
dence cannot be. Therefore the starting point for the present matter is
not property or due process of law, but that the defendant stood in
confidential relations with the plaintiffs . . .
51. See, e.g., R MILGRIM, supra note 37, §§ 1.01 to 1.07.
It is submitted that the property view underlies protection of trade secret
decisions, and is, in fact, the keystone upon which the protection body of case
law rests. The existence of a protectable property interest is the basis for eq-
uity jurisdiction, and for remedies such as declaration of a constructive trust
and injunctive relief.
Id. at 1-42.
52. Simply because a trade secret may take on many of the attributes of property,
such as assignability and alienability, does not help to decide whether a trade secret
exists. To state that a trade secret is protectable because it is property is to confuse the
basis for, and the consequences of, trade secret protection. See generally R. MLGRIM,
supra note 37, §§ 1.01 to 1.10; Root & Blynn, Abandonment of Common-Law Principles:
The North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 823, 825
n.19 (1982); Comment, Theft of Trade Secrets: The Need for a Statutory Solution, 120
U. PA. L. REV. 378, 381-85 (1971).
53. 244 U.S. 100 (1917).
54. Id. at 102.
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It may be argued that Masland is not authority under state law
because since Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins5 federal authority is not
binding upon matters of substantive common law.56 However, the Mas-
land view that the protectable property interest in a trade secret is a
consequence of a confidential relationship has been advanced fre-
quently since Erie by federal courts applying state law.57 The UTSA
includes trade secret protection when the secret was acquired, dis-
closed, or used in "breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to main-
tain secrecy."58 This would include a breach or inducement of a breach
of confidence by a present or former employee, agent, or subcontractor.
The problem with relying solely on breach of confidence or duty to
maintain secrecy as a theory for trade secret protection is that it does
not go far enough. It fails to provide a theoretical basis for protecting
trade secrets from use or disclosure when they are acquired in other
circumstances, such as (1) by industrial espionage; (2) by one merely
having knowledge that the information was derived from or through
someone who had either utilized improper means to acquire it, or had
disclosed it in breach of a duty to maintain its secrecy; or (3) by acci-
dent or mistake.
C. Improper Means
Trade secrets can be protected more generally by disallowing their
acquisition through the use of improper means. This has the advantage
of including other forms of industrial espionage or theft in addition to
acquisition through breach of confidence. The Restatement includes
55. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
56. See R. MILGRIM, supra note 37, § 1.01[1].
57. See, e.g., Servo Corp. of Am. v. General Electric, 393 F.2d 551, 555 (4th Cir.
1968) ("The gravamen in a trade secrets case is a breach of confidence, rather than an
infringement of a property right .... "); Klockner-Humboldt-Deutz v. Hewitt-Robins,
486 F. Supp. 283, 286 (D.S.C. 1978) ("This is not an action for infringement, since no
patents are involved, but is brought for the protection of trade secrets. These actions
have as their foundation a breach of faith or a confidential relationship."); Wilkes v.
Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 383 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 (D.S.C. 1974). (["Wlhile a trade secret is
clearly a property right, protected from unauthorized use or disclosure, it is the breach of
confidence by unauthorized disclosure, rather than the infringement of a property right,
which is the gravamen of trade secret cases." Id. (citation omitted)). See also Future
Plastics, v. Ware Shoals Plastics, 340 F. Supp. 1376 (D.S.C. 1972). The court stated:
Confidential relationship is the keystone of a trade secret action. The rela-
tionship of employer-employee is not by itself sufficient to create a confidential
relationship. There must be an express understanding as to the confidential
nature of the information or the circumstances must be such that the employee
is aware of the confidence placed in him by the employer.
Id. at 1384 (citation omitted).
58. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1(1), 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990).
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both theories."" After commenting on the rejection of the opposing
property theory of trade secret protection, the Restatement empha-
sizes "a general duty of good faith," which protects against both breach
of confidence and acquisition of a trade secret by improper means, in
addition to breach of contract.60 The Restatement view is generally fol-
lowed."1 The UTSA broadly defines "improper means" to include
"breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy. '0 2
The question remains: What conduct amounts to "improper
means"? In E.I. dupont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher3 the court
held that photographing an unfinished plant from an airplane consti-
tuted improper means for acquiring a trade secret. The Court recog-
nized the amorphous nature of the phrase "improper means," but
quoted the Restatement as an aid: "A complete catalogue of improper
means is not possible. In general they are means which fall below the
generally accepted standards of commercial morality and reasonable
59. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do
so, is liable to the other if
(a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or
(b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by
the other in disclosing the secret to him, or
(c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of the facts that it was
a secret and that the third person discovered it by improper means or that the
third person's disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the other,
or
(d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was secret and that its
disclosure was made to him by mistake.
Id.
60. Id. comment a, which states:
The suggestion that one has a right to exclude others from the use of his trade
secret because he has a right of property in the idea has been frequently ad-
vanced and rejected. The theory that has prevailed is that the protection is
afforded only by a general duty of good faith and that the liability rests upon
breach of this duty; that is, breach of contract, abuse of confidence or impro-
priety in the method of ascertaining the secret.
61. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). The Court
stated:
The protection accorded the trade secret holder is against the disclosure or
unauthorized use of the trade secret by those to whom the secret has been
confided under the express or implied restriction of nondisclosure or nonuse.
The law also protects the holder of a trade secret against disclosure or use
when the knowledge is gained, not by the owner's volition, but by some "im-
proper means" . . ..
Id. at 475-76 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939)). See also R. MILGRIM, supra
note 37, § 2.01 n.2 (citing cases).
62. UNiV. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1(1), 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990).
63. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971).
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conduct."" The Kewanee court cited Christopher's holding with ap-
proval, stating that a trade secret owner is protected against disclosure
or use of its trade secret "when the knowledge is gained, not by the
owner's volition, but by some 'improper means,' which may include
theft, wiretapping, or even aerial reconnaissance." 65 The UTSA also
defines "improper means" to include "theft, bribery, misrepresentation
. . . ,or espionage through electronic or other means." 6 The Commis-
sioners' comment to this section states that "[ilmproper means could
include otherwise lawful conduct which is improper under the circum-
stances, ' 67 such as the aerial reconnaissance in Christopher.
It may at first seem that Christopher opened the door to limitless,
or at least undefinable limits, on how to apply an improper means
standard. To qualify information as a trade secret, however, the owner
must have taken steps "that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy."'68 In any event, Kewannee expressly limited
Christopher to the acquisition of trade secrets "not by the owner's
volition."69
If trade secret protection were limited to acquisitions by improper
means, coverage would be incomplete, even under the broad UTSA
definition of "improper means." Gaps in coverage would include the
acquisition of a trade secret (1) by one merely having knowledge that it
was derived from or through someone who had either used improper
means to acquire it, or had disclosed it in breach of a duty to maintain
its secrecy, or (2) by accident or mistake.
For example, what if du Pont's trade secrets were discovered acci-
dentally by a competitor while on a commercial flight over du Pont's
unfinished plant? In Christopher the purpose of the flight was aerial
reconnaissance to discover a competitor's trade secrets.70 Should trade
secrets receive the same protection from accidental discovery that they
receive from deliberate industrial espionage? Obviously, some theory
other than improper means must be the basis for protection against
such "innocent" discoveries.
D. Misappropriation
Neither the Restatement nor the UTSA limits trade secret protec-
tion to breaches, inducements to breach confidences, or other improper
64. Id. at 1016 (quoting RESTATEMENT oF TORTS § 757 comment f (1939)).
65. 416 U.S. at 475-76 (citation omitted).
66. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1(1), 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990).
67. Id. comment, 14 U.L.A. 438-39.
68. Id. § 1(4)(ii), 14 U.L.A. 437-38.
69. 416 U.S. at 475-76.
70. 431 F.2d at 1013.
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means. The Restatement also protects against the disclosure or use of
a trade secret when the secret was acquired (1) "from a third person
with notice of the facts that it was a secret and that the third person
discovered it by improper means or that the third person's disclosure
of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the other," or (2) "with
notice of the facts that it was a secret and that its disclosure was made
to him by mistake.
7 1
The UTSA bases liability on misappropriation of a trade secret. It
defines misappropriation broadly to include all of the theories upon
which trade secret protection may be based. First, misappropriation
includes the acquisition of a trade secret by one who "knows or has
reason to know" that it was acquired by "improper means. '72 Second,
misappropriation includes the disclosure or use of a trade secret by one
who acquired it by improper means. 73 Third, misappropriation includes
the disclosure or use of a trade secret by one who, "at the time of dis-
closure or use, knew or had reason to know" that it was (a) "derived
from or through" one who acquired it by improper means, 4 (b) "ac-
quired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy
or limit its use,"'7" or (c) "derived from or through" one owing a duty to
maintain its secrecy or limit its use.76 Finally, the UTSA's definition of
misappropriation includes the disclosure or use of a trade secret by one
who "before a material change of his position, knew or had reason to
know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been ac-
quired by accident or mistake."'7 A liberal reading of this provision
would mean that the reasonably protected trade secret in Christopher
would be protected against even accidental discovery during a commer-
cial overflight.
International News Service v. Associated Press7 8 (INS v. AP) il-
lustrates an extreme application of the misappropriation theory. Even
though the Associated Press (AP) had posted its news bulletins pub-
licly without benefit of copyright protection, the Supreme Court held
that it would constitute unfair competition for the competing news
gathering service, International News Service (INS), to benefit com-
mercially from AP's work while the news was still fresh. According to
the Court, INS was "endeavoring to reap where it has not sown," and
71. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757(c), (d) (1939).
72. UNiF, TRADE SEOc9ETs ACT § 1(2)(i), 14 U.L.A. 437-38 (1990).
73. Id. § 1(2)(ii).
74. Id. § 1(2)(ii)(B)(I).
75. Id. § 1(2)(ii)(B)(II).
76. Id. § 1(2)(ii)(B)(III).
77. Id. § 1(2)(C).
78. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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was "appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have sown. '79 The
Court stated that the principle was analogous to "the equitable theory
of consideration in the law of trusts-that he who has fairly paid the
price should have the beneficial use of the property," and concluded
that the misappropriation of AP's news bulletins was "unfair competi-
tion because [it was] contrary to good conscience."80
The important distinction between INS v. AP and Christopher is
the manner in which the information was learned. In iNS v. AP Asso-
ciated Press published the news to the public, but in Christopher the
court determined du Pont took reasonable steps to protect its trade
secrets, which were acquired by an overflight surreptitiously under-
taken specifically to discover them. Neither the Restatement nor the
UTSA would go as far as the court did in INS v. AP. The Associated
Press's voluntary public disclosure would terminate trade secret pro-
tection, because by definition, a trade secret requires reasonable pre-
cautions to preserve its secrecy. As already noted, Kewanee expressly
limited Christopher to the acquisition of trade secrets "not by the
owner's volition."81
Public policy protecting trade secrets from industrial espionage is
relatively noncontroversial. The more difficult policy issues arise in
protecting an employer from misappropriation of trade secrets by a
former employee, as opposed to preserving a former employee's right to
pursue the occupation for which he is most suited. This calls for a clear
distinction between the general knowledge and skills acquired during
employment, which the employee should be free to use, and trade
secrets or other confidential information so acquired, which the em-
ployer has a right to preserve against misappropriation. Courts have
adopted a rule of reason approach in attempting to reconcile these two
opposing considerations. As stated in Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary
Corp.,8 2 the ex-employer should be protected from trade secret misap-
propriation by an ex-employee, "where the granting of such protection
will not unduly hamstring the ex-employee in the practice of his occu-
pation or profession.
'8 3
The difficulty in applying either a rule of reason or balancing test
is in determining what information an ex-employee can use with impu-
nity. It may be argued that a confidential employment relationship
should put the employee on notice that information disclosed is a trade
79. Id. at 239-40.
80. Id.
81. See supra text accompanying note 69.
82. 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1962).
83. Id. at 288, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 211 (quoting von Kalinowski, Key Employees and
Trade Secrets, 47 VA. L. REv. 583, 599 (1961)).
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secret.8 ' Determining what information qualifies as a trade secret is not
always easy, however, even when a confidential relationship has been
established. Consequently, some commentators maintain that the com-
mon law places an undue burden on the employee.8 5 A subsequent em-
ployer cannot know precisely what information a former employer may
claim to be protectable as a trade secret. The dilemma is exacerbated
when the ex-employee knows neither the nature nor the scope of the
former employer's claimed trade secrets. This then becomes the prob-
lem of anyone who would hire a competitor's former employee to per-
form similar work. If competitors are unwilling to risk a trade secret
lawsuit, the ultimate result may be to make a skilled employee with
knowledge of trade secrets a virtual hostage of the original employer.
The UTSA recognizes the difficulty in maintaining secrecy while
providing fair and adequate notice of the exact boundaries of the trade
secret. These boundaries are important because they enable others to
(1) avoid misappropriation (and possible contempt for violating an in-
junction), (2) form an intelligent opinion on whether the trade secret
has been misappropriated, and (3) challenge its validity as a trade se-
cret.8 0 The UTSA's solution is the provision for flexible court protec-
tion, including "granting protective orders in connection with discovery
proceedings, holding in-camera hearings, sealing the records of the ac-
tion, and ordering any person involved in the litigation not to disclose
an alleged trade secret without prior court approval.
8 7
IV. REMEDIES
A. In General
Damages, injunctions, restitution, or any combination of these
remedies are available under both the Restatement " and the UTSA8
84. R. MILGRIM, supra note 37, §§ 3.02[1][d], 3.05[l][a].
85. See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 5, at 396.
86. The Commissioners' comment notes:
If reasonable assurances of maintenance of secrecy could not be given, merito-
rious trade secret litigation would be chilled. In fashioning safeguards of confi-
dentiality, a court must ensure that a respondent is provided sufficient infor-
mation to present a defense and a trier of fact sufficient information to resolve
the merits. In addition to the illustrative techniques specified in the statute,
courts have protected secrecy in these cases by restricting disclosures to a
party's counsel and his or her assistants and by appointing a disinterested ex-
pert as a special master to hear secret information and report conclusions to
the court.
UNiF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 5 comment, 14 U.L.A. 461 (1990).
87. Id. § 5.
88. The Restatement defines "remedies" as follows:
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Damages normally equal the loss to the plaintiff, including lost prof-
its.90 Of course, a plaintiff's damages may actually exceed the defend-
ant's gain from the misappropriation. On the other hand, if the misap-
propriator's gain exceeds the plaintiff's losses, the plaintiff may recover
the defendant's profits through restitution, to prevent unjust enrich-
ment.9 1 In determining a misappropriator's unjust gain, courts apply a
"standard of comparison" test that compares costs using the trade se-
cret with the costs the defendant would have incurred without the
Remedies. One who has a right under the rule stated in this Section is
entitled to a remedy or remedies appropriate under the circumstances. He may
recover damages for past harm, or be granted an injunction against future
harm by disclosure or adverse use, or be granted an accounting of the wrong-
doer's profits, or have the physical things embodying the secret, such as de-
signs, patterns and so forth, surrendered by the wrongdoer for destruction.
Moreover, he may have two or more of these remedies in the same action if the
court is competent to administer them. Defenses generally available in tort ac-
tions and actions for injunctive relief are also available here, insofar as they are
applicable.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment e (1939).
89. The UTSA defines "injunctive relief" and "damages" as follows:
§ 2. Injunctive Relief
(a) Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined. Upon application
to the court, an injunction shall be terminated when the trade secret has
ceased to exist, but the injunction may be continued for an additional reasona-
ble period of time in order to eliminate commercial advantage that otherwise
would be derived from the misappropriation.
(b) In exceptional circumstances, an injunction may condition future use upon
payment of a reasonable royalty for no longer than the period of time for
which use could have been prohibited. Exceptional circumstances include, but
are not limited to, a material and prejudicial change of position prior to acquir-
ing knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation that renders a prohibi-
tive injunction inequitable.
(c) In appropriate circumstances, affirmative acts to protect a trade secret may
be compelled by court order.
§ 3. Damages
(a) Except to the extent that a material and prejudicial change of position
prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation renders a
monetary recovery inequitable a complainant is entitled to recover damages for
misappropriation. Damages can include both the actual loss caused by misap-
propriation and the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not
taken into account in computing actual loss. In lieu of damages measured by
any other methods, the damages caused by misappropriation may be measured
by imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for a misappropriator's unau-
thorized disclosure or use of a trade secret.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 2, 3, 14 U.L.A. 449, 455-56 (1990).
90. See Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387, 1392-93 (4th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892 (1972).
91. See, e.g., Int'l Indus. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 696, 699 (3d Cir.
1957), cert. dismissed, 355 U.S. 943 (1958).
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trade secret.0 2 Under the UTSA damages can include both actual loss
and restitution for unjust enrichment "to the extent that it is not
taken into account in computing actual loss. '9 3 The UTSA expressly
denies double recovery.
94
Exemplary damages may be available under general tort theory.
The UTSA specifically provides for them, although they cannot exceed
twice the amount awarded for actual damages. The UTSA also pro-
vides for restitution in cases of "willful and malicious misappropria-
tion."9  Thus, while the UTSA's explicit provision of possible treble
damages may be viewed as providing a bonus to a plaintiff, it may in
fact result in a ceiling on the amount that might be recovered when
unlimited exemplary damages would have been available under com-
mon law.
The UTSA modifies the usual American rule by adding a provision
for the recovery of attorney's fees to the plaintiff in the case of "willful
and malicious" misappropriation. It balances the scale, however, by
also providing for attorney's fees to the prevailing party when a misap-
propriation claim or a motion to terminate an injunction is made or
resisted in bad faith.9 6
B. Injunctive Relief
A conflict has arisen over whether an injunction against the use or
disclosure of a misappropriated trade secret should continue to be en-
forced after the trade secret has ceased to exist because it was subse-
quently published or became generally known or readily ascertainable.
The basis of the conflict is found in the sometimes conflicting public
policies of preventing misappropriation of trade secrets by improper
means and, at the same time, preserving competition and employment
opportunities by not unduly restricting access to ideas outside the lim-
ited protections of the patent and copyright laws.
On the one hand, a perpetual injunction might be justified to pun-
ish and deter misappropriation by improper means. In Shellmar Prod-
ucts v. Allen-Qualley Co.97 the Seventh Circuit upheld a perpetual in-
junction on the theory that dissolution of the injunction would
encourage misappropriation by providing a means to legitimize the use
92. See, e.g., id. at 701-02.
93. UNiF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a), 14 U.L.A. 455-56 (1990).
94. Id. § 3 comment, 14 U.L.A. 456-57.
95. Id. § 3(b), 14 U.L.A. 455-56.
96. Id. § 4, 14 U.L.A. 459.
97. 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1936) (relying on A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron
Works Co., 73 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1934)), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 695 (1937). See M. JAGER,
TRADE SECRETS LAW HANDBOOK § 6.04[1] (1982).
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of a misappropriated trade secret merely by publishing it, thereby al-
lowing a misappropriator "to profit by its own wrong.""8
It is understandable why a court would be reluctant to provide a
misappropriator with a legal laundering device of publication as a
means of legalizing his continued use of a misappropriated trade se-
cret. On the other hand, the equities change when the trade secret
ceases to exist after to its misappropriation because of voluntary publi-
cation by the trade secret owner. Thus, the Second Circuit held in
Conmar Products Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co.90 that a
wrongful inducement to divulge trade secrets before a patent was is-
sued should not "deprive the wrongdoer of his right to avail himself of
the patentee's dedication"'10 0 once the trade secrets ceased to exist
upon patent issue."'
A third situation arises when neither the trade secret owner nor its
misappropriator has disclosed the secret to others, but it is neverthe-
less discoverable by either independent development or reverse engi-
neering of the lawfully obtained product containing the secret. In K-2
Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co.'0 2 the Ninth Circuit held that the maximum
duration of an injunction under these circumstances is the period of
time it would have taken the misappropriator to have discovered the
secret through such lawful means.
0 3
Citing Head Ski Co., the Commissioners viewed the UTSA as fol-
lowing "the trend of authority" in rejecting perpetual injunctions, and
limiting the duration of injunctive relief to the misappropriator's "tem-
poral advantage over good faith competitors.' ' 4 Thus, the UTSA pro-
98. Shellmar, 87 F.2d at 110; see also Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States
Rubber Co., 371 F.2d 950, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("We do not believe that a misap-
propriator or his privies can "baptize" their wrongful actions by general publication of
the secret .... Their gain is ill-gotten and the passage of time or publication to the rest
of the world should not serve to cleanse their hands . . ... "), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911
(1967).
99. 172 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949).
100. Id. at 156.
101. However, as held in Schreyer v. Casco Prods. Corp., 190 F.2d 921, 924 (2d Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952), even though Conmar would bar a perpetual
injunction against a prior misappropriator following a later disclosure by its owner, the
court could not properly order "an accounting of profits resulting from the acceleration
of the date when production was possible."
102. 506 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1974).
103. Id. at 474.
104. UNIF. TRADE SECRETs AcT § 2 comment, 14 U.L.A. 449-51 (1990); see also id. §
3 comment, 14 U.L.A. 456-57 (Damages).
Like injunctive relief, a monetary recovery for trade secret misappropria-
tion is appropriate only for the period in which information is entitled to pro-
tection as a trade secret, plus the additional period, if any, in which a misap-
propriator retains an advantage over good faith competitors because of
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vides a workable compromise in preventing a misappropriator from
benefiting from his wrongful conduct, while maintaining competition in
ideas.
One unanswered question is whether the UTSA's express limita-
tion on the duration of an injunction is limited to the Head Ski Co.
situation. Literally applied, section 2(a) apparently also would reject
the Shellmar doctrine. If "good faith competitors" learn the trade se-
cret from the misappropriator it might be argued that an injunction
against the misappropriator should last only so long as is reasonably
necessary "to eliminate commercial advantage ... through misappro-
priation." 10 5 However, competitors who learn about the trade secret
through the improper disclosure by the misappropriator may not be
good faith competitors. They would be such only if they acquired the
trade secret through proper means. Although the UTSA does not con-
tain a definition of "proper means," the Commissioners' comment
states that "obtaining the trade secret from published literature" ' is
one example. However, a competitor's use or disclosure of a trade se-
cret obtained from literature published by a misappropriator may also
be misappropriation if at the time of disclosure, or before a material
change of position, the competitor knew, or had reason to know, that it
was an unauthorized disclosure of a misappropriated trade secret.107 In
this situation section 2(a) would require the termination of an injunc-
tion against the misappropriator, and by negative implication would
require that it continue, at least until the secret has become generally
known or readily ascertainable by proper means. In addition, competi-
tors who receive information wrongfully published by a misap-
propriator may be liable for misappropriation unless they can establish
that the trade secret was learned, or was readily ascertainable, by
proper means, rather than by the improper disclosure by a
misappropriator.
C. Good Faith Defense
Both the Restatement and UTSA state that one who had notice
that a trade secret was misappropriated or disclosed by mistake is lia-
ble for its subsequent disclosure or use.108 A problem arises when a
misappropriation. Actual damage to a complainant and unjust benefit to a mis-
appropriator are caused by misappropriation during this time alone.
Id.
105. Id. § 2 comment, 14 U.L.A. 449-51.
106. Id. § 1 comment, 14 U.L.A. 438-39.
107. Id. § 1(2)(ii)(B), (C), 14 U.L.A. 437-38.
108. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 757 (1939):
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do so, is
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trade secret is disclosed to one who in good faith pays for it or learns
about it through mistaken disclosure without knowing that it was se-
cret, or that it was misappropriated or disclosed by mistake. In this
instance, the rights of two innocent parties, the trade secret's owner
and its innocent recipient, must be balanced.
The UTSA follows the Restatement position that one who learns
about a trade secret and has no notice or reason to know that it is a
trade secret, and does not know that it was either misappropriated or
disclosed by accident or mistake, is not liable to the owner for its dis-
closure or use prior to receipt of this notice.109 In addition, both the
UTSA and the Restatement would permit the defense that one has
materially changed one's position prior to receipt of notice. °10 This eq-
uitable defense necessarily must turn on the nature and materiality of
the change of position. Neither the Restatement nor the UTSA makes
a distinction between use and disclosure following notice. It would be
difficult to imagine a change of position that would justify unlimited
disclosure after notice, however, even though future use, including dis-
closure necessary to its use, may be justified from actions taken to util-
ize the trade secret, such as building a plant or retooling an assembly
line.
The Restatement goes even further and makes good faith payment
for a trade secret, without notice, an absolute defense to past or future
disclosure or use. This is premised on the argument that "[tihe burden
of guarding the secrecy" is on the trade secret owner; therefore, the
risk of loss should be on the owner "when the alternative is the causing
of loss to another guilty of no misconduct.""'
The UTSA rejects the Restatement's extension of absolute immu-
liable to the other if:
(d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was secret and that its
disclosure was made to him by mistake.
UNiF. TRADE SEcRErs AcT § 1 (2), 14 U.L.A. 437-38 (1990):
(2) 'Misappropriation' means:
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or im-
plied consent by a person who
(C) before a material change of his [or her] position, knew or had
reason to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it
had been acquired by accident or mistake.
109. UNIF. TRADE SEcRETS AcT § 1(2), 14 U.L.A. 437-38 (1990).
110. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 758 (1939); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(ii)(C), 14
U.L.A. 437-38 (1990).
111. RESTATEMiENT OF TORTS § 758 comment e (1939).
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nity to good faith purchasers for value without notice.1 2 The UTSA
would provide equitable relief, however, when (1) the type of accident
or mistake leading to disclosure would amount to a failure to take the
necessary reasonable precautions to preserve the trade secret,1 3 or (2)
a court determined that it would be "unreasonable" to absolutely en-
join future use, or award damages.124 In the latter event, the UTSA
adds the specific provision for future use conditioned "upon payment
of a reasonable royalty for no longer than the period of time for which
use could have been prohibited." 15 Depending on equitable considera-
tions, the UTSA would permit a court's determination that no injunc-
tion would be appropriate, including a royalty order injunction." 6 Sim-
ilar reasoning may justify the denial of the recovery of damages against
a good faith acquirer of a trade secret."7
112. UNir. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2 comment, 14 U.L.A. 450 (1990):
With respect to innocent acquirers of misappropriated trade secrets, Section
2(b) is consistent with the principle of 4 Restatement Torts (First) § 758 (b)
(1939), but rejects the Restatement's literal conferral of absolute immunity
upon all third parties who have paid value in good faith for a trade secret
misappropriated by another. The position taken by the Uniform Act is sup-
ported by Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (CA7, 1971)
in which a defendant's purchase of assets of a corporation to which a trade
secret had been disclosed in confidence was not considered to confer immunity
upon the defendant.
Id.
113. Id. § 1(2)(ii)(C), 14 U.L.A. 437-38 (1990). "The type of accident or mistake that
can result in a misappropriation under Section 1(2)(ii)(C) involves conduct by a person
seeking relief that does not constitute a failure of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy under Section 1(4)(ii)." Id.
114. Id. § 2 comment, 14 U.L.A. 449-51.
115. Id. § 2(b), 14 U.L.A. 449. But see RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 758 comment e
(1939), suggesting, but rejecting, the possible alternative of "making the duty Qf the re-
cipient of the secret conditional upon his reimbursement."
116. The UTSA discusses royalty order injunction as follows:
Like all injunctive relief for misappropriation, a royalty order injunction is ap-
propriate only if a misappropriator has obtained a competitive advantage
through misappropriation and only for the duration of that competitive advan-
tage. In some situations, typically those involving good faith acquirers of trade
secrets misappropriated by others, a court may conclude that the same consid-
erations that render a prohibitory injunction against future use inappropriate
also render a royalty order injunction inappropriate. See Prince Manufacturing
Inc. v. Automatic Partner, Inc., 198 U.S.P.Q. 618 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976) (pur-
chaser of misappropriator's assets from receiver after trade secrets disclosed to
public through sale of product not subject to liability for misappropriation).
Id. § 2 comment, 14 U.L.A. 449-51 (1990).
117. 117. The UTSA discusses damages as follows:
Monetary relief can be appropriate whether or not injunction relief is
granted under Section 2. If a person charged with misappropriation has mate-
rially and prejudicially changed position in reliance upon knowledge of a trade
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D. Statute of Limitations
In applying statutes of limitations, a conflict of authority has
arisen over the question whether trade secret misappropriation is a
continuing tort. If it is, "an injured party may recover for use during
the statutory period preceding the filing of the suit. . ". ."1s If it is not
a continuing wrong, the limitation period upon all recovery, including
continued use, begins upon the initial misappropriation. m The UTSA
opts for the noncontinuing wrong approach to the statute of limita-
tions, but provides that the three-year limitation period does not begin
to run until the misappropriation has been, or reasonably should have
been, discovered.120 According to the Commissioners, "[i]f objectively
reasonable notice of misappropriation exists, three years is sufficient
time to vindicate one's legal rights.'
1 21
E. Effect of UTSA on Other Law
It is important to note that the UTSA "is not a comprehensive
statement of civil remedies."' 2 By its terms, the UTSA only "displaces
conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law ... providing civil reme-
dies for misappropriation of a trade secret.""' It expressly does not
affect contractual, other civil, or criminal remedies, whether or not
based upon misappropriation of a trade secret."
2 4
An example of the importance of this limitation is found in
Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc.125 The
court in Warner-Lambert held that a contract by a licensee or assignee
to pay in perpetuity for the use of a trade secret, disclosed in confi-
secret acquired in good faith and without reason to know of its misappropria-
tion by another, however, the same considerations that can justify denial of all
injunctive relief also can justify denial of all monetary relief. See Conmar
Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d [150] (CA2, 1949) (no
relief against new employer of employee subject to contractual obligation not
to disclose former employer's trade secrets where new employer innocently had
committed $40,000 to develop the trade secrets prior to notice of
misappropriation).
Id. § 3 comment, 14 U.L.A. 456-57.
118. Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 371 F.2d 950, 953 (D.C.
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967).
119. Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 407 F.2d
288, 292-93 (9th Cir. 1969).
120. UNIF. TRADE SECRETs ACT § 6, 14 U.L.A. 462 (1990).
121. Id. comment.
122. Id. § 7 comment, 14 U.L.A. 463.
123. Id. § 7(a).
124. Id. §§ 7(a), 7(b)(1)-(3).
125. 178 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd mem., 280 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1960).
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dence, may be specifically enforced even after the trade secret ceased
to exist because it was subsequently published or became readily ascer-
tainable by others.126 This was justified under contract law on the
ground that the disclosure of the trade secret provides the necessary
consideration for the promise to pay, regardless of the future status of
the trade secret. Thus, the UTSA provisions and their interpretations
regarding the continued duration of an injunction once a trade secret is
public information would be inapplicable to duties undertaken under a
valid contract.
The public policies and legislative definitions contained in the
UTSA might well play an important part in interpreting and enforcing
other law applicable to trade secrets, however, even if they do not dis-
place it. Thus, a contract not to use or disclose "trade secrets" may
require the court to determine what trade secrets, if any, are covered
by the contract. This, in turn, depends on the definition and identity
of the claimed trade secrets. It would be reasonable to assume that,
absent other authority, the court would look to the statutory defini-
tions in the UTSA for guidance. Similarly, the UTSA duration provi-
sions might guide the court to determine whether the parties might be
presumed to have intended the agreement to cover disclosure or use of
trade secrets that subsequently ceased to exist because of public disclo-
sure. Finally, the public policy regarding trade secret protection con-
tained in the UTSA may affect a court's interpretation and enforce-
ment of postemployment noncompetition agreements and agreements
restraining the use or disclosure of confidential information learned in
the course of employment.
V. CONCLUSION
Commercial development in South Carolina requires uniformity in
the protection of trade secrets. State and federal courts generally adopt
the Restatement definition of a trade secret and the theoretical basis
of an action of misappropriation arising out of a breach of good faith
conduct.127 The case-by-case development of trade secret law, however,
has not developed uniformly in all areas. For example, courts differ in
their protection of information that could be discovered properly, but
is in fact obtained by improper conduct.2 8 The Restatement leaves un-
126. Id. at 665. State contract laws to this effect have not been preempted by the
federal patent laws. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
127. See R. MILGRIM, supra note 37, § 2.01.
128. Compare Henry Hope X-Ray Prods. v. Marron Carrel, Inc., 674 F.2d 1336 (9th
Cir. 1982)(issue was whether defendants "could have" obtained the information by
proper means) with Elnicky Enter., Inc. v. Spotlight Presents, Inc., 213 U.S.P.Q. 855
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)(issue was how information was obtained).
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answered many issues, including the continued duration of an injunc-
tion against use by a misappropriator of a trade secret, when that se-
cret has lost its protection by becoming public knowledge or has
become discoverable by proper means. Some inconsistencies, such as
the applicable statute of limitations, developed because the Restate-
ment does not address the problem.
Uniformity of trade secret protection is, in itself, a desirable goal
for commercial advancement both within the state and the nation. The
conflicts and inconsistencies in the case-by-case development under
the Restatement should be resolved, and trade secret law should be
made more definitive and current. The UTSA represents a well-consid-
ered codification of trade secret law, "preserving its essential differ-
ences from patent law.112 9 In addition to such benefits as the adoption
of a single statute of limitations and uniform definitions of a trade se-
cret and misappropriation, the UTSA artfully codifies the better-rea-
soned cases of trade secret protection.
The time has arrived for South Carolina to join the other states
that have already adopted the UTSA. It may be a long time, if ever,
before the American Law Institute adopts a new Restatement covering
the modern law of trade secret protection. It may be expected that any
new Restatement would track the widely adopted UTSA closely. In the
interim, nothing would be lost by adopting the UTSA. If necessary, or
desirable, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws may be expected to adopt amendments to the UTSA in light of
any new developments, including a new Restatement. Certainly, the
General Assembly would be free to make any amendments that future
developments might suggest or require. Whether or not these amend-
ments might be necessary in the future, adoption of the modern law of
trade secret protection promulgated in the UTSA would benefit both
commercial stability, and research and development, today.
129. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. 434-36 (1990).
1991]
27
Day: Protection of Trade Secrets in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
28
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol42/iss3/5
